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RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
 
CREDIBLE BEHAVIORAL HEALTH, INC. V. JOHNSON: UNDER 
THE PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT INTERPRETATION, THE TERMS 
OF A PROMISSORY NOTE REQUIRED REPAYMENT OF A LOAN 
WHEN AN EMPLOYEE QUITS OR WHEN AN EMPLOYEE IS 
FIRED.  
 
By: Hannah Williams 
 
     The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that, pursuant to Maryland Rule 
7-113(f), the circuit court may only set aside factual determinations upon 
clear error and should review legal conclusions de novo.  Credible Behavioral 
Health, Inc. v. Johnson, 466 Md. 380, 389-99, 220 A.3d 303, 307-14 (2019).  
Accordingly, the circuit court erred in applying the clearly erroneous standard 
of review to the lower court’s interpretation of the promissory note and 
subsequently erred in construing the note to require loan repayment only 
when an employee has quit.  Id.  Moreover, the court undertook a common 
sense analysis of the promissory note, finding the underlying intent of the 
parties unambiguous and therefore, only one interpretation of the note was 
reasonable.  Id. at 399, 220 A.3d at 314.   
     Credible Behavioral Health, Inc. (“Credible”) offered a tuition loan 
repayment program to its employees who wanted to obtain certificates of 
higher education.  Under the program, a percentage of the loan is repaid by 
the employee depending upon the amount of time he works for Credible after 
completing his studies.  On August 10, 2016, Emmanuel Johnson (“Mr. 
Johnson”) entered into the loan repayment program, and each party 
memorialized their agreement via a promissory note.  The agreement outlined 
the terms of repayment in proportion to the time spent at Credible and the 
consequences upon an event of default.  Thereafter, Credible loaned Mr. 
Johnson $12,529.  In December of 2017, Credible fired Mr. Johnson, who at 
that time had not yet obtained his degree.  Credible and Mr. Johnson 
subsequently entered into a repayment plan, under which Mr. Johnson made 
only one payment on February 28, 2018.  After Mr. Johnson failed to make 
additional payments on the loan, Credible brought an action against Mr. 
Johnson seeking repayment of the debt.     
     The District Court for Montgomery County entered judgment in favor of 
Mr. Johnson, finding that the balance of the loan became due only if Mr. 
Johnson quit his employment with Credible.  Subsequently, Credible 
appealed the district court’s ruling.  The Circuit Court for Montgomery 
County affirmed the lower court’s judgment finding that the district court was 
not clearly erroneous in its construal of the promissory note.  Credible 
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petitioned the Court of Appeals of Maryland for certiorari, which was 
granted on June 7, 2019.   
     Two issues came before the court: (1) Did the circuit court err in reviewing 
the district court’s findings for clear error rather than de novo; and (2) Did 
the terms of the promissory note, construed under Maryland law of contract 
interpretation, permit Credible to obtain repayment of the loan?  Credible 
Behav. Health, 466 Md. at 388, 220 A.3d at 307.   
     The Court of Appeals of Maryland began its analysis by delineating the 
circuit court’s appropriate standard of review under Md. R. 7-113(f).  
Credible Behav. Health, 466 Md. at 389, 220 A.3d at 308. The court used the 
predecessors of Md. R. 7-113(f), Rule 1386, and appellate rule Md. R. 8-
131(c), Rule 886, to ascertain the appropriate standard.  Id. at 389-90, 220 
A.3d at 308.  Under Md. R. 8-131(c), an appellate court will only deviate 
from the judgment of the trial court if the ruling is clearly erroneous.  Id. at 
388, 220 A.3d at 307.  Like Md. R. 7-113(f), this rule does not explicitly state 
the standard of review applicable to legal conclusions; however, the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland held that the standard of appellate review over a lower 
court’s legal conclusions is de novo.  Id.  Md. R. 8-131(c)’s predecessor, R. 
886, contained language identical to that of R. 1386, and in Ryan v. Thurston, 
the Court of Appeals analogized R. 1386 and R. 886 to determine the 
appropriate standard of review.  Id. at 390, 220 A.3d at 308 (citing Ryan v. 
Thurston, 276 Md. 390, 391-92 (1975)).  The Court of Appeals of Maryland 
affirmed the symmetrical method of analysis in Ryan, distinguishing that the 
clearly erroneous standard applies to factual determinations and legal 
conclusions are reviewed de novo.  Credible Behav. Health, 466 Md. at 390-
91, 220 A.3d at 308-09. 
     Next, the court swiftly determined that interpretation of the promissory 
note was a legal conclusion, in line with its consistent position that contract 
interpretation is a question of law.  Credible Behav. Health, 466 Md. at 392, 
220 A.3d at 309.   
     Finally, the court discussed the possible interpretations of the note.  
Credible Behav. Health, 466 Md. 393, 220 A.3d at 310.  Maryland courts 
regularly endorse an objective approach to contract interpretation, designed 
to discover the parties’ intentions by considering the context and plain 
language of the provisions.  Id. at 394, 220 A.3d at 310-11.  If a reasonable 
person could assign multiple meanings to a contract term, that term is 
ambiguous in the eyes of the court, and external evidence is permitted to 
establish the parties’ intentions.  Id. at 394, 220 A.3d at 311.  Here, the 
contested contract term was “terminate.”  Id.  Using Webster’s Dictionary as 
a reference, the court found that loan repayment was “conditioned upon” the 
cessation of employment with Credible.  Id. at 395, 220 A.3d at 311.      
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     As a foundational tenet, the court stressed the importance of applying 
common sense when construing contracts.  Credible Behav. Health, 466 Md. 
at 397, 220 A.3d at 313.  With this theory in mind, requiring loan repayment 
only when an employee quits undermines an objective, common sense 
approach in two ways.  Id.  First, interpreting the note this way leads to the 
unequal treatment of employees dependent upon whether they were fired 
from Credible or whether they quit.  Credible Behav. Health, 466 Md. at 398, 
220 A.3d at 313.  If the rationale of the lower courts prevailed, an employee 
who was fired from Credible would not have to repay their obligations, while 
an employee who quit would.  Id.  This disparity has no foundation in contract 
interpretation and runs afoul to the tenets of common sense.  Id.   
     Second, the plain language of Paragraph 4(c) of the promissory note, the 
“Drop/Fail Repayment” clause, set out the events that constitute default and 
commencement of repayment. Credible Behav. Health, 466 Md. at 398, 220 
A.3d at 313.  The court explained that under Mr. Johnson’s interpretation of 
the note, an employee who expects to fail a class, a default event under 
Paragraph 4(c), could purposefully misbehave and induce Credible to 
terminate his employment before the class ends.  Id.  In that situation, an 
employee could act “unilaterally” to bypass the Drop/Fail clause and evade 
loan repayment.  Id.  Thus, the court determined that this scenario also 
offends the theory of common sense because it results in the disparate 
treatment of employees based upon the reason for employment cessation.  Id.   
     Therefore, Credible’s interpretation of the promissory note was the only 
construal compliant with the doctrine of common sense.  Credible Behav. 
Health, 466 Md. at 399, 220 A.3d at 314.  Interpreting the note to require loan 
repayment when an employee quit or is fired permits harmonization between 
the provisions stipulating the remaining loan balance and the events leading 
to default.  Id.  The court’s view of the promissory note manifests that the 
parties intended the loan to be repaid when an employee is fired or quits.  Id.   
     In Credible Behavioral Health, the Court of Appeals of Maryland affirms 
longstanding principles of contract interpretation based on objectivity and 
common sense.  Maryland circuit courts are provided with a comprehensive 
and historical analysis of the rules under which the appropriate standard of 
review should be selected.  Analogizing the circuit court’s and appellate 
court’s rules should clarify subsequent questions on the matter and taper the 
amount of error in cases to come.  Moreover, businesses who are interested 
in implementing a similar type of loan repayment program now have the full 
weight of the Court of Appeals of Maryland behind them, should an issue 
involving termination and repayment arise.  On the other hand, Maryland 
employees who opt into a similar program are on notice of the potential 
outcome should an issue of contract interpretation arise with similar plain 
language and context.                                                                                              
